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Abstract: Switzerland is embarking on a new energy strategy by phasing out nuclear power, increasing renewables 
and energy efficiency as well as meeting its Kyoto target of the Second Commitment Period. We contribute to this 
new cruise by disentangling the effects of the Swiss economic policies to promote energy efficiency and the use of 
less CO2 intensive energy sources. Those policies encompass a CO2 levy, an emissions trading scheme (ETS), a 
renewable feed-in tariff as well as some national and international offsetting and target agreements. 
The policies target different sectors and are linked in various ways either by exchanging tradable units or by serving 
as exemption criteria. For example, companies can negotiate target agreements or participate in the Swiss ETS in 
order to be exempted from the CO2 levy. Given these interactions, those policies form a world-wide unique 
instrument-mix in combining a tax, emissions trading, voluntary agreements, subsidies and project-based 
mechanisms on a national and international level. 
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Our findings show that this combination of policies leads to inefficiencies. For example, external costs of road-based 
mobility have been inadequately internalised and emissions abatement efforts are unevenly spread among sectors. 
They also reveal that, due to the interactions, the emission reductions from each policy are difficult to predict and 
complex rules are required to avoid double counting. Finally, meeting future targets domestically seems ambitious, 
when less surplus is carried over from the previous commitment periods, given the low emissions intensity of the 
Swiss electricity-mix and high efficiency in the industry sector. 
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Disentangling the Effects of Swiss Energy and Climate Policies 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Switzerland is one of the few non-European Union countries which participates in the second Kyoto Commitment 
Period (2013-2020). It has committed itself to reduce its emissions in 2020 by 20% below 1990 levels. The national 
legislation requires that this target is achieved by domestic measures only (Swiss Confederation 2013). This seems 
rather ambitious given that the 8% reduction target under the first Kyoto Commitment Period (2008-2009) was only 
achieved by making use of a high share of international units and carbon sequestration effects of domestic forests 
(see Figure 1). The intended, nationally determined, contribution for 2030 is 50% below 1990 levels in 2030 of which 
30% have to be achieved domestically (Swiss Confederation 2015). In addition to those climate policy targets, 
Switzerland's government and parliament decided to phase out nuclear power, possibly until 2034. In order to 
achieve this transformation, the government adopted the "Energy Strategy 2050" in 2012, laying out a roadmap 
with medium-term and long-term policy measures (Swiss Federal Council 2013). Thus, in order to achieve both 
aims, a broad set of policies has been introduced or is in the pipeline. 
Figure 1: First and Second Swiss Kyoto Commitment Period Targets and Reductions. 
 
Since theory predicts that economic instruments are more efficient than others instruments (e.g. regulatory), we will 
focus in our analysis only on market and price-based instruments, such as taxes, subsidies and trading schemes, 
which are at present part of the Swiss energy and climate-policy-mix. In case policies have changed over time or 
inter-temporal connections exist e.g. between the Commitment Periods, former policies are also assessed. 
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This paper contributes to existing literature in three ways: first, by disentangling the effects of the various energy 
and climate policies and their complex linkages including inter-temporal effects; secondly, by qualitatively evaluating 
the efficiency, effectiveness and both the advantages and disadvantages of international links of the closely 
intertwined policy-mix; thirdly, by detecting empirical research gaps in Swiss energy and climate policy ex-post 
evaluation. 
The paper is structured as follows: It first describes each policy separately, assigning it to the sector for which it is 
most relevant. Policies include the CO2 levy, Swiss emissions trading scheme (CH ETS), the renewable feed-in 
tariff as well as some domestic and international offsetting and quasi-voluntary target agreements. It then assesses 
the linkages between the different policies and assesses potential impacts on effectiveness, inefficiencies and cost-
benefits of including international linkages. It finishes with suggestions for future improvements and by addressing 
research gaps. 
2. SWISS ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY
Swiss greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 reached 51.43 million tons of CO2 equivalent of which 43.24 million tons 
were direct CO2 emissions. Figure 2 depicts the share of greenhouse gas emissions by different sectors. 
Figure 2: Swiss climate and energy policies by targeted sector (Source: Authors). 
Note: LSVA is a tax on heavy vehicle road transport. 
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It shows that the transport sector makes the largest sectorial contribution (32%), followed by the emissions of the 
production sector, which includes industry and services, and the household sector. Waste and agricultural 
emissions are included in others. Consistent with the classification in the following subsections, we assign the 
different policies to one particular sector, usually the main targeted sector for the emissions reductions. However, 
it has to be mentioned that most of the policies, e.g. the CO2 levy, may also be relevant for other sectors, e.g. the 
production sector. Particularly challenging was the assignment of domestic compensation projects and 
programmes, as they can reduce emissions in any sector. Since those projects and programmes are financed by 
fossil fuel producers and importers, and managed by a foundation called Climate Protection and Carbon Offset 
(Klimaschutz und CO₂-Kompensation, KliK), they are reported under the heading of KliK and the transport sector 
in this paper. 
2.1. Household sector 
Emissions from heating and cooking in the household sector are subject to the CO2 levy (see section 2.1.1). Part 
of the generated revenue is used to finance the buildings programme (see section 2.1.2). Households are also the 
major target group for the network surcharge to finance the cost-reflective feed-in tariff (see section 2.1.3). 
2.1.1. CO2 levy on heating and process fuels 
Since 2008, Switzerland has applied a CO2 levy on fossil heating and process fuels in order to incentivise a more 
efficient use of fossil fuels and a fuel switch to carbon-free energy sources. Exemptions apply to companies which 
are particularly emission intensive and trade- exposed, provided they commit to emission reduction targets (see 
Section 2.2). The initial rate of the levy was set at CHF 12 per ton of CO2 and has been increased over the years 
to CHF 60 per ton of CO2 at the beginning of 2014. This means that a levy of CHF 0.159 per litre is paid for extra 
light heating oil and CHF 0.1536 per kg for natural gas (see Table 1). The rate may increase further, depending on 
the achieved emission level, since the levy is raised if the actual level of CO2 emissions from heating and process 
fuels in a year is above the annual target. The maximum level is set at CHF 120 per ton of CO2 by current legislation 
but new legislation for the second package, starting in 2021, is under discussion (Baur and Himmel, 2012). 
Table 1: Swiss CO2 levy development over time. 
 2008 2009 2012 2014 2016 2018 
CHF / ton CO2 12 24 36 60 72-84 96-120 
Extra Light heating oil CHF / l 0.0318 0.0636 0.0954 0.159 0.1908 0.2226 - 0.318
Natural Gas CHF / kg 0.03072 0.06144 0.09216 0.1536 0.18432 0.215 - 0.3072
Source: Swiss Confederation 2013 and own calculations 
 
The revenue generated by the CO2 levy is refunded to households and the production sector in proportion to their 
respective payments. While households are compensated per capita, the redistribution to firms occurs relative to 
their social security payments and, thus, constitutes a small element of an environmental tax reform. One third of 
the proceeds, i.e. around CHF 300 million of totally 900 million per year, is not redistributed but allocated for the 
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building programme (see Section 2.1.2). The programme is partly co-funded out of cantonal budgets and co-
managed by the federal government and the cantons. 
Most research regarding the CO2 levy or ecological tax reform use economic models to predict the impact of different 
tax levels on the Swiss economy. Boehringer and Mueller (2014) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, calibrated to empirical data for Switzerland, in order to quantify the economic impacts of environmental tax 
reforms. The key findings are that compliance with the CO2 reduction targets requires high CO2 taxes on economic 
activities that are not eligible for international emissions trading. Likewise, electricity consumers are burdened with 
substantial electricity taxes. Environmental tax reforms are not likely to generate welfare gains without accounting 
for the benefits of improved environmental quality. The analyses of Kiuila and Rutherford (2013) suggest that the 
current climate policy in Switzerland will not be able to move the economy towards the required 10% CO2 reduction. 
Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) theoretically assess the implications of giving companies the choice of being 
regulated by either a CO2 tax or by an emissions trading scheme, taking asymmetric information between regulator 
and companies as well as uncertainty on actual abatement costs into account. They show that when both instrument 
types are offered simultaneously, it will never be optimal for all firms to participate in emissions trading but for the 
tax there exist multiple optimal equilibria. Thus, the usual price-versus quantity criteria do not apply for companies 
which are indifferent regarding the policy options. To sum up, there seems to be a lack of empirical ex-post 
evaluation of the CO2 levy, assessing the effectiveness so far. 
2.1.2. Building programme 
Buildings account for around 28% of CO2 emissions in Switzerland in 2012. This high share of greenhouse gas 
emissions is due to the fact that most houses are heated with fossil fuels. In order to reduce energy use and CO2 
emissions, refurbishment is promoted through the buildings programme. As mentioned above, it is financed via a 
share of CO2 levy revenues (at most CHF 300 million per year) and funds from the cantons. The programme has 
two components: first, a federal, nationwide programme for the improvement of building shells; secondly, various 
cantonal programmes for promoting renewable energy, the use of waste heat and the optimisation of energy 
systems. 
In 2013, nearly 10’000 applications for insulation support were granted and the programme is planned to be 
extended in the Swiss energy strategy. It is considered that by the year 2020, the entire programme will result in a 
cumulative reduction of up to 2.9 million tons of CO2 (Swiss Confederation, 2013). 
2.1.3. Cost-reflective feed-in tariff (KEV) 
Renewable policies are not directly in the focus of this paper. However, given the fact that exemptions for the 
network surcharge levy which is used to finance the cost-reflective feed-in tariff (called Kostendeckende 
Einspeisevergütung, KEV) are granted for companies which commit to a target agreement on energy efficiency, a 
short description of the policy is included in this paper. 
The KEV was part of the Energy Act (EnG), which came into force in January 2009 yet allows to support installations 
built from 2006 onwards. It aims to promote the uptake of both renewable energy and efficient electricity use. It 
applies to various technologies and the level of the feed-in tariff aims to fund the gap between the cost-covering 
remuneration and the income from selling electricity. Given the technological progress and higher market 
penetration over time, it is expected that the fees for new installations will gradually decrease. The following 
technologies are eligible: hydropower (up to 10 MW), photovoltaics, wind, geothermal, biomass and waste. 
Technology specific tariffs are listed in Table 2. In order to accelerate their uptake, PV installations of less than 10 
kW have since 2014 the option, to receive up to 30% of investment cost upfront instead of feed-in tariffs. Another 
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new feature is that producers of renewable electricity have the explicit right to directly consume it without feeding it 
into the grid. Deep geothermal investors can receive a risk guarantee. 
Table 2: Renewable production and feed-in tariffs in 2013. 
Technology Number of  Installations 2013 
Total Production
hours 2013 
Production 
MWh 2013 
Tariff paid 2013 
CHF / kWh 
Biomass 212 3,025 580,451 0.1947 
Photovoltaic (10-30 kW) 6164 797 139,278 0.4691 
Wind (2-3 MW) 17 1,734 51,217 0.1887 
Small Hydro (<10 MW) 334 4,299 617,927 0.1551 
Geothermal* 0 6,000-8,000 0.40 
TOTAL 6727 2,570 1,388,874 
*Potential production hours and tariff
Source: http://www.stiftung-kev.ch/fileadmin/media/kev/kev_download/de/140320_KEV_Bericht_2013_DE.pdf 
The KEV is funded through a network surcharge which is capped by law at CHF 0.015 per kWh. In 2014, consumers 
paid effectively only CHF 0.006 per kWh (CHF 0.005 per kWh for cost-covering remuneration and CHF 0.001 per 
kWh for water protection measures), but the Federal Council decided to increase the current network surcharge 
from CHF 0.006 per kWh to CHF 0.011 per kWh on January 1st, 2015. 
In 2014, total funds available for feed-in tariffs amounted to CHF 284 million. Given the fact that remuneration is 
granted for 20 to 25 years, depending on the technology, a high share of the annual income is already committed 
for accepted renewable investment. In addition, Swissgrid, which is managing the fund, has to bear the uncertainty 
of the future development of the electricity price since it is financing the gap between the electricity price and the 
cost-covering remuneration. Therefore, at the end of 2014, waitlisted applications for new renewable electricity 
facilities amounted to more than 35’000, most of them PV. As mentioned above, exemption from the network 
surcharge are granted for energy-intensive industries if they commit to both a target agreement on energy efficiency 
and to investing 20% of the saved network surcharge over 3-5 years into energy efficiency measures which are not 
economically viable or in the installation of renewables. In 2013, 1'388 GWh of renewable electricity was generated 
by the KEV, which corresponds to a share of 2.4% of Swiss final electricity consumption. Small hydro amounted to 
617 GWh and biomass to 580 GWh, PV generated 139 GWh and wind 51 GWh (see Table 2). 
There has been little research published regarding an evaluation of the KEV so far. One study has compared the 
costs and production potential of renewables in Switzerland and has assessed current investment barriers. Based 
on the authors’ assessment, the barriers vary by technology: Biomass investments are viewed as risky since it is 
difficult to ensure the supply of the input and the buyer for the output (heat) in the long run. Roof-top PV is seen to 
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be too small for utilities to invest in. Wind, geothermal and hydro face often regulatory problems, clashes with 
environmental regulations and acceptance issues (Wenger and Operto 2013). There seems to be a lack of more 
in-depth empirical ex-post evaluation that assesses the impact of the KEV on electricity prices, the impact on 
investments in energy efficiency or any possible distributional consequences. 
2.2. Production sector 
The industry sector can broadly be split up into ETS and Non-ETS companies. Since 2013, ETS participation has 
been mandatory for certain companies (see Annex 6 of the CO2 regulation). There is an opt-in provision for other 
companies if they fulfil certain criteria. In contrast to the European Union, ETS fossil fuel power plants and combined 
heat and power plants need to compensate their emissions and are currently excluded from the ETS (see Section 
2.2.2). For Non-ETS companies, target agreements allow for the refund of the CO2 levy and the network surcharge 
to finance the KEV (section 2.2.3). ETS companies may also set an energy efficiency target in order to have the 
network surcharge refunded. 
2.2.1. Swiss Emissions Trading Scheme (CH ETS) 
In 2008, in conjunction with the CO2 levy, Switzerland introduced its first emissions trading scheme (CH ETS). 
Companies were incentivised to participate voluntarily in the ETS by being exempted from the CO2 levy. Companies 
received freely allocated allowances according to agreed emissions reduction targets, which were negotiated on 
the basis of technological potential of economic viability measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the 
company (see section 2.2.3). Around 450 companies participated voluntarily in the scheme and accepted emissions 
targets. As can be seen from Table A1 in the Annex, freely allocated allowances were higher than the obligations 
based on emissions, which means that the scheme was in total over allocated. Trading volumes have been 
negligible, apart from the transfers of the surplus to the Climate Cent Foundation (see section 2.3.2). 
Since 2013, the rules for the ETS have been aligned with the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) with 
a view to link both systems in the future. Thus, the new scheme is a mandatory scheme which allows for opt-in of 
companies which want to participate voluntarily. However, no companies have voluntarily opted-in so far, thus, the 
number of participating companies is much smaller in Phase II. The number of covered installations has been 
reduced from 450 to around 54 installations or 35 companies in Phase II, but the coverage of emissions has 
increased by more than 40% from an average of 3.1 million ton CO2 per year in Phase I to 5.3 million tons CO2 per 
year in Phase II (based on allocation). This increase in emissions, in conjunction with a 90% lower number of 
companies covered, is due to the fact that more emissions intensive companies (e.g. refineries, cement and 
combustion installations from communes for district heating) have been regulated in Phase II.1  Given that most of 
the covered installations belong to sectors with a high risk of leakage, most allowances are still allocated for free. 
In Phase II harmonized allocation rules apply which are based on the same benchmarks of emissions performance 
1 The cement sector has been covered in Phase I by cemsuisse, the Swiss association of cement producing 
companies, but not all companies and installations were covered, therefore, the mandatory coverage has increased 
the covered emissions substantially and Holcim became the biggest player in the Swiss ETS. 
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as in the EU. The benchmarks are based on the goods produced (e.g. tons of paper) or on heat. The formula is the 
following (see also Table 3): 
Allocationi = Benchmark × activity ratei × adoption factori × reduction factori 
Table 3: Adoption and reduction factor for Swiss Allocation Formula. 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Adoption factor 0.8 0.7286 0.6571 0.5857 0.5143 0.4429 0.3714 0.3 
Swiss reduction factor 99.91% 98.55% 97.17% 95.78% 94.38% 92.96% 91.54% 90.09% 
EU ETS reduction factor 94.27% 92.64% 90.98% 89.30% 87.61% 85.90% 84.17% 82.44% 
The activity rate is either the average of production in 2005–2008 or 2009–2010, depending if a company did already 
participate in Phase I. The adoption factor does not apply if a company is part of a sector which is defined as high 
risk of leakage, which is the case for most of the manufacturing companies covered. However, the factor may apply 
for some of the waste incineration companies or district heating plants. The reduction factor is defined in the CO2 
regulation and ensures that the sum of calculated allocations per company in Switzerland is equal to the cap set for 
the ETS-sector. 
One of the other amendments in Phase II is the introduction of auctioning of unused units of a new entrant reserve. 
The reserve consists of 5% of the cap (see Table A1 in Annex). The withholding of 5% of allocation results in an 
average under-allocation of installations of around 2000 tons of CO2 (see Figure 3). Most of the installations 
belonging to manufacturing industries are, however, long. Whereas combined heat and power producing 
installations such as, for example, airport Zurich or refineries, e.g. Tamoil, which has announced to close down in 
2015, are under-allocated. 
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Figure 3: Individual and average allocation position CH ETS Phase II. 
The overall scarcity of the scheme depends not only on the allocation and emissions in Phase II, but also on two 
other factors which will have a major impact. First, the carry-over of national CHUs, international units like Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs, see Section 2.3.2) and Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) from Phase I into Phase 
II. For international units, rules apply that limit the banking to a level of 6’070’960 CERs and 6’070‘960 ERUs (Art.
139 Abs. 3 CO2-Verordnung).2 Based on the registry information, the maximum of bankable CHU1 and CERs/ERUs 
from Phase I is estimated to be around 1.6 million units for installations which were covered in both phases (see 
Table A1 in Annex). However, most of the installations have made use of the opportunity to sell their surplus from 
Phase I to the Climate Cent Foundation at a price of CHF 50 per CHU1 (Climate Cent 2013), therefore, it is assumed 
that most of the surplus has not been transferred into Phase II. 
Secondly, the possibility to use additional international emissions reduction units reduces the pressure of national 
emission cutbacks. Again, limits for international units apply which are determined in Art. 48 (CO2-Verordnung) as 
follows: first, for installations that already participated in Phase I a maximum of 11% of the allocated CHU1 in 2008-
2012 can be used for compliance in both phases. Thus, used CERs and ERUs in Phase I have to be subtracted 
2 Based Article 3, paragraph 13 of the Kyoto Protocol there is no banking restriction for Assigned Amount Units and 
a limit of  2.5% of the assigned amount for CERs and ERUs. RMUs cannot be carried over. 
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from the total eligible amount in Phase II. Secondly, installations which have only participated since Phase II are 
allowed to make use of 4, 5 % of their actual greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 to 2020. 
In Figure 4, the overall scarcity is estimated, taking both inter-temporal and international flexibility into account. As 
mentioned above, the banking from Phase I to Phase II may be much lower, given the sales to Climate Cent 
Foundation. Nevertheless, there seems to be no overall scarcity in the Swiss ETS in Phase II, just by accounting 
for the potential use of international emissions reduction units. 
Figure 4: Estimated Scarcity Swiss ETS Phase II. 
Most research regarding the Swiss ETS estimates the effects of linking with the EU ETS either based on computable 
general equilibrium models (Voehringer 2012) or by qualitative analysis by Oberauner and Krysiak, (2008). There 
seems to be a lack of empirical ex-post evaluation of Phase I of the Swiss ETS. This paper has made some first 
contributions towards this required research area by assessing the over-allocation of units, the use of banking 
between Phase I and Phase II and the number of units sold to the Climate Cent Foundation. Further research could 
assess the effectiveness of emissions reductions by estimating a baseline without emissions trading or the 
functioning of the ETS in terms of efficiency by assessing if companies with low abatement costs did reduce 
emissions as well as distributional impacts. 
2.2.2. Compensation requirements for new Fossil-fuel thermal plants 
New fossil fuelled thermal plants will only be approved if 100% of the CO2 emissions are compensated. Those new 
plants can use up to 50% international units whereas the other half needs to be domestic offset units. Today only 
one new, combined cycle gas power plant has been approved in Chavalon, which is expected to emit 750’000 tons 
of CO2 annually. This special treatment for new fossil fuel plants has been chosen since the demand of those new 
plants would distort the Swiss ETS market, given that the new entrant reserve under the emissions trading scheme 
is, with around 281'643 CHUs, too little to cover such large new investments. 
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2.2.3. Target agreements 
Target agreements which establish a linear reduction path are set between companies and institutions, such as the 
ministry of environment (BAFU), and are a common element of Swiss climate policy. Their role has changed over 
time and they have developed from a voluntary approach in early days to a legally binding commitment. We refer 
to them as “quasi-voluntary” since the choice to participate is up to the company. Once the choice is made, however, 
the target is legally binding. The incentive to participate is provided by the possibility to apply for an exemption from 
the CO2 levy and the surplus charge for the KEV. Different thresholds and preconditions to be eligible for exemptions 
apply for the different policies.3 In some Swiss cantons, those target agreements are also used to fulfil requirements 
on the cantonal level. Large-scale consumers can, for example, choose a universal target which enables them to 
not having to fulfil the regulations on cantonal level, e.g. maximum of non-renewable energy. In case of non-
compliance, the company has to pay either the CO2 tax including any interest retroactively for the entire period or 
the network surcharge. 
The Energy Agency for Industry (Energieagentur der Wirtschaft, EnAW) and Cleantech Agentur Schweiz ACT are 
responsible to support companies in developing target agreements. Both assist to formulate specific company-
related targets up to 2020 either on the basis of CO2 emissions or energy efficiency (including electricity) which 
both can be met through the implementation of economically viable measures.4 Companies will be treated according 
to one of the three models. The first model, which sets the target as a 15% reduction in 2020 compared to 2012, 
applies if the company participated already in Phase I. The second model of individual targets applies if the company 
is entering the agreements for the first time. The third model applies for smaller companies which set a list of 
economically viable measures that need to be implemented. In the first two cases, if companies are performing 
better than the set reduction path, they are able to sell the surplus of achieved emissions reductions, e.g. to KliK. If 
they have problems, they may use a limited number of international units to achieve their target (BAFU 2013). 
To assist, a comprehensive range of products for practical support such as, for example, an energy-check-up tool 
and monitoring tools, is provided by EnAW. Energy intensive companies (> 1’500 tons of annual CO2 emissions) 
participate in a different programme with an energy expert (called energy model) compared to small and medium-
sized companies which do not have an own energy expert and fall below this threshold (called small and medium-
sized model). In 2013, around 2’661 companies from a broad range of sectors ranging from service industry to food 
and animal, obtained target agreements with EnAW (EnAW 2014). 
3 In order to be eligible for the CO2 levy exemption companies have to belong to one of the sectors listed in annex 
7 of the revised CO2 Law and emit 100 tons of CO2 annually. Companies may apply for a reimbursement of the 
network surcharge which finance the KEV if electricity costs ≥ 5-10% gross value added and the total reimbursement 
is ≥ CHF 20’000. For cantonal requirements, large-scale consumers are defined as > 5 GWh of annual heat 
consumption or > 0.5 GWh electricity consumption. 
4 Two different pay-back periods are used to determine if a project is economically viable: pay-back of 8 years for 
infrastructure projects and 4 years for all other energy projects. 
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The target agreements up to 2012 were intended to save about up to 15% of energy in ten years. Based on the 
latest assessment by EnAW, the target was overachieved by 25% (EnAW 2014). The cumulative impact of all 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions since 2001 was estimated at 1.4 million tons of CO2 in 2012 and 
for energy savings at 6’140 GWh, respectively. With the start of the Second Kyoto Commitment Period in 2013, 
new targets had to be agreed on. Given that companies apply for several exemptions (CO2 levy, network surcharge 
and cantonal regulations), a coordination of CO2 and energy efficiency targets is underway. 
We are not aware of any independent evaluation of the target agreements. This seems to be relevant given the 
potential conflict of interest between EnAW and companies. Assessing the effectiveness of past targets (e.g. which 
sectors overachieved, which companies underachieved their target and why?) and the efficiency (e.g. how strict 
were targets set and did they account for different abatement costs?) would be interesting future research topics. 
2.3. Transport sector 
As mentioned above, the transport sector is completely exempted from the CO2 levy, which applies only to heating 
fuels but not to motor fuels. However, road traffic is subject to a series of other charges. Not all of these charges 
are motivated by energy or climate objectives but they, nevertheless, have an impact on transport behaviour and, 
therefore, on fossil fuel use and CO2 emission. 
The mineral oil tax on gasoline and diesel is currently CHF 0.7312 (0.4312 plus 0.30 surcharge) and CHF 0.7587 
per litre (0.4587 plus 0.30 surcharge), respectively. 50 % of the base tax and 100 % of the surcharge are earmarked 
to finance traffic outlays, such as road construction and maintenance. In 2013, total revenue amounted to almost 
CHF five billion which corresponds to eight percent of total tax revenue by the federal government. 
In addition, the transport sector is subject to the general value added tax at the rate of eight percent. The value 
added tax is calculated on the gross price, i.e. including the mineral oil tax and the HVT. 
Compared to the existing taxes, the planned surcharge by the petrol and diesel importers of around CHF 0.02 per 
litre in order to finance the domestic offsets is very small and emphasizes its fiscal character. Assuming a price 
elasticity of -0.5 a one percent increase of gasoline and diesel prices will yield an almost negligible incentive effect. 
Therefore, the reductions due to the investments in emissions reduction measures is more important, which will be 
explained in more detail in section 2.3.2. 
Beside these fiscal measures, the transport sector is subject to several other regulations that do not directly have 
an impact on user prices. The revised CO2 law restricts the average CO2 emissions of passenger cars newly put 
on the market to 130 g CO2 per kilometre from 2015 onwards. The restriction must be met by each importer or 
producer of cars. However, importers and producers are allowed to merge their emissions in order to meet the 
target. In case of non-compliance, a penalty is imposed, which will amount to CHF 142.50 per gram above the 
target by 2019. To illustrate this, for a car with 200 g CO2 per kilometre, the penalty would add up to almost CHF 
10’000. 
2.3.1. Heavy vehicle fee (LSVA) 
Since 2001, a performance-related heavy vehicle fee (Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA) has 
been in power. The objective of the LSVA is to induce a shift of goods transportation from road to rail and, at the 
same time, to finance infrastructure projects for public transport. The law explicitly states that the tax rate includes, 
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among others, external costs5. Thus, the LSVA comes close to a Pigouvian-tax, which is remarkable since most of 
the market based instruments applied in practice follow a price standard approach. 
Depending on the emission performance of the vehicle, the tax rate varies from CHF 0.0205 to 0.031 per ton and 
kilometre. Note that the taxable base is the maximal possible weight of the vehicle and not the actual weight. For 
example, a 40 ton vehicle crossing Switzerland from Basel to Chiasso pays a tax between CHF 230 and 350. Yearly 
revenue add up to CHF 1.5 billion, of which one third goes to the Cantons and two thirds are used federally to 
support new railway projects. 
With little surprise, the determination of the external costs, namely congestion costs, led to a legal dispute between 
the Swiss Road Transport Association (ASTAG) and the Swiss Directorate General of Customs in charge of 
collecting the LSVA. The dispute was finally settled by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 2013. 
Lüchinger and Roth (2014) estimate a significant negative effect of around 4-6% for the LSVA, which are in line 
with the ex-ante elasticity estimates of the Federal Office for Spatial Development in 2007. Most likely the effect is 
due to a shift of transit traffic to the shortest way through the Alps and a substitution towards rail traffic. 
2.3.2. National Compensation Projects (Climate Cent / Climate Protection and Carbon Offset, KliK) 
Transport fuels have been exempted from the CO2 levy from the very beginning. Instead a surcharge is levied on 
all petrol and diesel imports and the revenue is used to finance offsets in Switzerland and abroad. This arrangement 
was the outcome of interest groups of the oil importers with the support of other industry groups such as Strasse 
Schweiz (Swiss road traffic association) (Brönnimann et al. 2014).  
The first programme called the “Climate Cent” was voluntary and ran from 2005 – 2013 with a surcharge at a rate 
of CHF 0.015 per litre of fuel. The implementing entity was the Climate Cent Foundation which had to meet the 
reduction target of totally 17 million ton CO2 over the period 2008-2012. It received approximately CHF 100 million 
per year to invest into mitigation projects. Of the total reductions, at least 2 million tons needed to be offset within 
Switzerland, either in the transport, the building or the production sector. Up to 15 Million tons CO2 could be met by 
international emissions reduction units either Joint Implementation (JI) projects (Article 6 Kyoto Protocol) which are 
called Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects (Article 12 Kyoto 
Protocol) which are called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). Instead of planning and financing CDM or JI 
projects, the Climate Cent Foundation was also able to buy ERUs or CERs directly on the market from third parties. 
Since 2014, the Climate Cent has been replaced by an obligation for fossil fuels importers to compensate part of 
the transport-generated CO2 emissions (see revised CO2 Act). Given the new mandatory character of the successor 
of the Climate Cent Foundation, a new Foundation called Climate Protection and Carbon Offset (Klimaschutz und 
CO₂-Kompensation, KliK) was created. Importers of petrol, diesel, natural gas and kerosene that exceed the 
threshold of 1’000 tons of CO2 are required to offset a share of their emissions which is determined by the Federal 
Council. This share ranges from 2% in 2014-2015, 5% in 2016-2017, 8% in 2018-2019 up to 10% in 2020 and may 
5 The law explicitly states that the proceeds of the LSVA must not exceed road infrastructure and external cost 
(Schwerverkehrsabgabegesetz, Art. 7). 
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reach a maximum of 40% which will result in around 6.5 million tons of CO2 in total for the period 2013-2020 (around 
1.5 million tons CO2 in 2020). The surcharge rate has tripled but is not allowed to exceed CHF 0.05 per litre of fuel. 
Apart from the higher rate, KliK is not allowed to be meet its target by using international offsets anymore. 
The final report of the Climate Cent Foundation shows that the targets for 2005-2012 were slightly overachieved by 
around 1.7 million tons of CO2 equivalent emission reductions, of which around 1.1 million CHU1 were sold to KliK 
for CHF 53.8 million (KliK 2014). A total of 2.69 million tons CO2 emission reductions were achieved within 
Switzerland, more than half stem from the overfullfilments of the target agreements of combustibles in the industry 
sector. The other half has been achieved by reductions in motor fuels, buildings programmes and industrial heat or 
waste heat recovery. The highest direct costs occurred in the buildings programme with an average of CHF 838 
per ton compared to CHF 93 per ton in the other programmes (Climate Cent Foundation 2014). Around 16 million 
units were acquired internationally with the vast majority of international credits from CDM projects which were 
bought via brokers or traders (7.9 million tons of CO2 equivalent), only 0.5 million tons of CO2 equivalent were ERUs 
from JI projects. Around 2.6 million tons of CO2 equivalent were received due to the participation in the Asia Pacific 
Carbon Fund of the Asian Development Bank. The shortfall rate was 7.8 % for certificates which were directly 
purchased from project developers and 0% for traders. With regard to the quality of the international credits, the 
Climate Cent Foundation excluded certificates stemming from e.g. carbon sinks, large hydro and industrial gases 
projects. However, the targeted amount of Gold Standard labelled certificates had not been achieved, given a lack 
of supply. 
The costs for the international units with direct costs of CHF 15 per ton was substantially lower compared to Swiss 
emissions reductions which ranged from 93 to 838 CHF per ton (Climate Cent Foundation 2014). However, what 
needs to be taken into account is that the domestic programmes will generally deliver emission reductions beyond 
the commitment period of the Foundation. As Kunz and Muller 2010 show in their assessment, given the short 
contract time project developers accounted for those costs were put in relation to the shorter timeframe which made 
the projects more costly. In particular the projects under the building programme were sensitive to this calculatory 
cut-off given their high upfront fixed costs (e.g. wall insulation or efficient windows). This artificial effect has a 
negative impact on the overall efficiency of the Climate Cent investments, since projects that may have lower life-
time costs may not have received funding, whereas those with higher life-time costs but lower costs within the 
commitment period were supported. Another critique which leads to inefficiencies is that the Climate Cent 
Foundation mainly assesses their funding on a type or programme basis, comparing average costs rather than 
developing a marginal abatement costs curve for any type of possible reduction project. Finally, it seems that 
proving additionality of the projects was sometimes challenging, especially when the effect of other policies had to 
be delimited e.g. in the Eco-Drive programme (Climate Cent Foundation 2014). 
Up to now, research regarding the domestic offsets and exemptions of transportation fuels from the CO2 levy has 
been twofold. First, based on a static computable general equilibrium model, Imhof 2012 examines the efficiency 
losses and distribution impacts of the exemptions of the transport sector from the CO2 levy. Secondly, as mentioned 
above, an early empirical analysis of the Climate Cent Foundation was undertaken by Kunz and Mueller in 2010. 
However, there seems to be a lack of an empirical ex-post evaluation of the entire Phase I. 
3. ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF SWISS POLICY MIX
After describing the economic policies separately, this section aims at putting those pieces of the jigsaw together 
on order to detect interdependencies and inter-temporal effects. As Figure 5 depicts, surplus accumulation of CHUs 
as well as the use of international credits in Phase I has several impacts on Phase II: First, it has direct impacts on 
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scarcity in Phase II of CH ETS and on KliK. Secondly, it has indirect impacts on the compensation of new fossil 
plants and on the target agreements since they allow for the use of international credits and are linked through KliK. 
In the following sections, effects of the mix of instruments on effectiveness, efficiency as well as advantages and 
disadvantages of international links are assessed. 
Figure 5: Disentangling the inter-temporal linkages of policies and unit flows 
Note: Policies which can be used to be exempted from KEV and / or CO2 levy are highlighted in white font in black boxes. 
3.1. Effectiveness 
The criteria effectiveness assesses the ability of achieving the given emissions reduction target, here the 20% 
reduction in 2020 compared to 1990 within Switzerland. Assuming mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance 
at each individual policy level, effectiveness of the policy mix can be determined by assessing the expected 
emission reductions for each policy, taking policy overlaps into account. The most important elements to determine 
effectiveness are the actual emissions reduction contributions within Switzerland, potential leakage effects6 and the 
quality of offsets7. The aim of this paper is, however, not to quantitatively assess the effectiveness but rather to 
6 Leakage-shifts of production and emissions to other countries can compromise the effectiveness of any instrument 
and even increase emissions globally, thus, negatively impact effectiveness. 
7 Non-additional offset projects (meaning those that would have occurred in a business-as-usual scenario without 
the offset scheme or via the incentive of other policies) will lead, through the link to e.g. new fossil fuel plants, to an 
actual increase in domestic emissions as new plants will be allowed to emit more using those credits. 
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describe the interaction between the different policies which may make it more challenging in achieving the domestic 
reduction target. This is a necessary first step before future research can be undertaken in quantifying the overall 
effectiveness. 
Two aspects are important to understanding the interaction between the various policies and to detect potential 
overlaps and double counting: First, the inter-temporal link between Phase I and Phase II through banking, which 
illustrates the overlaps of periods and instruments between periods (see Figure 5). Secondly, there is the challenge 
of quantifying additional emissions reductions of domestic offsets when policies overlap. 
Taking the surrendered CERs and ERUs in Phase I into account, a surplus of 3'615'655 CHUs was accumulated 
(Table A1 in Annex) at the end of Phase I and different options were offered to companies: First, they were able to 
either bank those units if they participated in Phase II of the ETS (around 0.9 Million CHU’s). Secondly, in case they 
stayed under the target agreement, they were able to use them for achieving the targets for Phase II. Thirdly, they 
were able to sell those surplus units to the Climate Cent Foundation which in turn was selling its surplus to KliK at 
CHF 58 per unit (Climate Cent Foundation 2014). Based on the Swiss National Communication (Swiss 
Confederation 2013), the banking of companies into the second commitment period is only around 0.4 to 0.6 million 
units. Given those wide ranging figures, it is unclear how much of the achieved surplus in the First Commitment 
Period is actually transferred into Second Commitment Period. Nevertheless, it shows that achieving the target in 
the Second Commitment Period 2013-2020 will be easier given the substantial inter-temporal transfers. However, 
achieving those reductions domestically (domestic target) will be more challenging. It also shows that the quality of 
negotiated target agreements and the additionality requirements for domestic offsets under Phase I have impacted, 
through the carry-over provision, on the ease of achieving the Phase II target. As mentioned before, there seems 
to be a lack of independent evaluation of the negotiated agreements programme. The overachievement of the 
targets of 25% reported by EnAW may be an indicator that some economically feasible potential was not taken into 
account when setting the targets or that economic growth was lower than expected. It may also reflect a lack of 
political ambition in setting targets. 
With regard to the quality of offsets, two different elements have to be assessed: firstly, the additionality of domestic 
projects which includes investment as well as emissions additionality. Secondly, potential double counting of 
emissions reductions, especially if more than one policy has been applied, needs to be looked into. Figure 6 shows 
how additionality is determined if other policies need to be taken into account. To ensure that no double counting 
of emission reductions occurs, when a domestic compensation project receives money from different programmes 
(e.g. an energy efficiency project which got subsidies by the Cantonal Building Programme), the Ministry of 
Environment has developed three different methods. The first method tries to disentangle the impact of each policy 
similar to Figure 6 in order to quantify the additional emissions which allow for the creating of domestic offset credits. 
This means they differentiate each emissions level which would have been achieved by climate and / or energy 
policy, respectively in order to calculate the number of certificates to be issued. Two other methods apply if it is not 
possible to disentangle the impacts of each policy separately: the second method is to share emissions reductions 
equally on a cost basis among the stakeholders (e.g. by subsidies level) or the third method is that stakeholders 
agree on a different split of the emissions reductions (BAFU 2015). 
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Figure 6: Accounting for investment / emissions additionality and policy overlap (Source: BAFU 2013) 
 
All methods seem to be complicated and will need consensus of different institutions. Which of those approaches 
are mainly used could be an interesting future research project. However, the complexity involved in administrative 
costs of allowing multiple instruments to target the same reduction opportunity may be higher than the benefits and, 
therefore, policy makers may want to go back to a world in which one single policy can be applied for one emissions 
reduction (e.g. either building programme or generation of domestic offsets). 
3.2. Inefficiencies 
An equal price for CO2 emissions across all sectors is a necessary condition for an efficient reduction of CO2 
emissions. Ideally, this yields equal marginal abatement cost across all emitters and, therefore, minimal total cost. 
It is, however, not a sufficient condition because a cost minimizing reaction on price signals is not always 
guaranteed. It is quite obvious that the current policy scheme in Switzerland does not fulfil the necessary condition. 
There are several measures with different explicit or implicit CO2 prices. Also, these measures are not or only poorly 
interconnected so that an alignment of prices is hindered. Table 4 gives an overview of the current CO2 prices as 
well as the estimated abatement costs of the Swiss policy-mix. 
As mentioned before, the CO2 levy currently is set at CHF 60 per ton and, if needed, can be raised up the CHF 120. 
The subsidies paid to the national building refurbishment programme triggered investments with average abatement 
costs of CHF 126 per ton CO2 for insulation and CHF 185 for renewable energy projects. 
For the Swiss ETS, prices are available for the last three auctions. The price steadily decreased from CHF 40.25 in 
the May auction 2014 to CHF 20 in the November auction and to CHF 12 in the latest auction dating from January 
2015. These prices display an upper limit of expected abatement costs of firms regulated within the ETS scheme. 
The foundation KliK offers non-ETS firms with a target agreement to buy their certificates at a price of CHF 100 per 
ton CO2 reduced. Note again that these firms can sell the emissions reductions that go beyond 95 % of their 
individual target to KliK but not to ETS companies. Thus, the upper limit of abatement costs at CHF 100 for non-
ETS firms is substantially higher than those for ETS participants. In the transportation sector, KliK collects a fee 
that amounts to approximately CHF 0.015 per litre which translates into CHF 6.25 per ton CO2. The revenue then 
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is used to finance programmes with average abatement costs of CHF 58 to 168 per ton CO2 (KliK Jahresbericht 
2013). Finally, the heavy vehicle fee is calculated on the basis of external cost estimates (Ecoplan and Infras 2014). 
These estimates explicitly include climate cost at the rate of CHF 93 per ton CO2. 
Table 4: Prices and abatement costs per ton of CO2. 
Price CHF / ton 
CO2 
Costs CHF / ton 
CO2 
CO2 levy 60 (Maximum: 120) - 
Building programme (Konferenz kantonaler Energiedirektoren) - 126, 185 
CH ETS 
(http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/12435/index.html?lang=de) 12, 20, 40.25 
Target agreements: CO2 exemption from CO2 levy for non-ETS companies 
(KliK Jahresbericht 2013) - 100 
Obligation for compensation for transport fossil fuel importers KliK (KliK 
Jahresbericht 2013) 
6.25 
(Max: 20.8) 
58 – 168 
(Mean: 109) 
Heavy vehicle fee 93 - 
Table 4 shows that range of prices and cost per unit CO2 is substantial. Low prices and, thus, low abatement cost 
apply to private passenger transport which is only subject to a small fee as well as to firms within the ETS scheme. 
On the other side of the spectrum, the national building refurbishment programme supports renewable energy 
projects with average abatement costs of CHF 185 per ton CO2. Our findings are supported by other researchers 
such as Sceia et al. (2012) who use a Computable General Equilibrium and two sectorial energy models to evaluate 
the current policy-mix. They find higher welfare costs due to disparities in the prices and compared to a scenario 
using a uniform carbon tax. Likewise Wölfl and Sicari (2012) suggest applying the same implicit carbon price within 
and across broad sectors in order to achieve the targets more efficiently. They also suggest to switch from "quasi-
voluntary" measures towards more effective price-based instruments. 
While the special arrangement with energy- and export-intensive companies can be justified by international 
competitiveness and possible carbon leakage, the exemption of motor fuels from the CO2 tax seems mainly 
politically motivated. The original CO2 legislation in Switzerland foresaw a tax on motor fuels in case of non-
compliance with the targets of the first Kyoto Commitment Period. In the revised CO2 law, however, the tax applies 
to burning fuels only. The political process leading up to these exemptions showed that the Swiss Oil Association, 
with the support of automobile associations, was successful in imposing only a very small price increase to be 
passed on to their consumers in order to obtain the funds to buy offsets mainly from other sectors. The different 
policies have also different distributional impacts: For example, the revenues of the CO2 tax are mainly recycled to 
industry and households whereas the offset arrangement are not (Thalmann and Baranzini, 2007). 
20 
Unfortunately, even when taking such distributional or political aspects into account, the existing policy-mix, with a 
trading scheme for energy- and export-intensive firms and a CO2 tax for households, is far from second-best. A 
better trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility still requires a uniform price for CO2 emissions. 
Distributional objectives, on the other hand, can be achieved by the initial endowment of emission rights or the 
redistribution of revenues from market based instruments.8 Neither are administrative costs a convincing argument 
for a different regulation of emissions from the household sector and the production sector. There is no obvious 
reason why in one sector a tax and in another sector an emission rights scheme should entail more or less 
administrative costs. 
3.3. International versus domestic reduction 
In contrast to the policy until 2012, the Swiss climate and energy policy until 2020 aims to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for the most part domestically. However, greenhouse gases such as CO2 emissions have a global impact 
which is completely independent from its emission location. Therefore, as long as greenhouse gas emissions are 
considered by themselves, a global policy approach is paramount. The efficiency criterion requires that emissions 
are reduced where its cost are lowest globally. 
So much for theory. The political reality, on the other hand, is that the implementation of a comprehensive global 
climate policy seems to be an almost insurmountable task. As a consequence, regional initiatives led to international 
cooperation among selected countries, whereby the European ETS is by far the widest-reaching. For Switzerland, 
an alignment with the EU ETS has been discussed for quite a long time. At present, its realisation seems to be in a 
deadlock due to other bilateral problems between Switzerland and the EU which have to be solved first. 
Beside the efficiency argument for international cooperation in tackling the climate problem, there are two 
counterarguments that may be in favour of a unilateral policy. The first argument is based on a possible double 
dividend and, the second, on local external costs. 
Firstly, the double dividend theory states that “the revenue neutral substitution of the environmental tax for typical 
or representative distortionary taxes involves a zero or negative gross cost” (Goulder 1994, p. XX). If the double 
dividend holds an environmental tax reform that substitutes environmental for existing taxes such as income taxes 
would be beneficial even without considering environmental impacts. In this case, the fact that the environmental 
impacts occur abroad does not speak against a unilateral policy since the benefit of a less distorting tax system still 
accrues domestically. However, Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) showed that increasing the tax on environmentally 
harmful activities “typically exacerbate, rather than alleviate, pre-existing tax distortions – even if revenues are 
employed to cut pre-existing tax distortions” (p. XX). This is due to a higher consumer price for dirty goods which 
lowers the real after tax wage. The lesson learnt from this discussion is rather simple: As long as taxing labour-
income is second-best, a substitution of a narrow-based consumption tax on dirty goods for a broad-based labour 
tax cannot yield a double dividend. Thus, in general, an environmental tax cannot reduce the purely fiscal distortion 
8 For a proposal to reap a weak double dividend with little political opposition, see Felder and Schleiniger (2002). 
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of the domestic tax system and must be motivated by external environmental cost. De Mooij (2000) expresses the 
conclusion rather bluntly: “The double dividend is dead, long live the first dividend”. 
According to the second argument, the burning of fossil fuels does not only causes CO2 emissions and, thus, 
contributes to global warming but, at the same time, produces a variety of air pollutants, such as particulate matter 
or nitrogen oxide. In contrast to global warming, air pollution is more of a local or regional problem which can be 
dealt with on a national level. Therefore, even a unilateral policy to reduce CO2 emissions can yield a net benefit 
domestically as long as the improvement of local air quality due to less consumption of fossil fuels is strong enough. 
Ideally, the consideration of both, local and global externalities due to fossil fuel use, comprises two distinct 
instruments. The first instrument can be implemented unilaterally and aims to internalize domestic externalities. The 
domestic scheme can be adjusted to take into account the differing external cost. For example, a different tax rate 
might apply for burning fuels and for motor fuels. The second instrument, on the other hand, attempts to exclusively 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions on an international level. Here, a co-ordination or even a merger of the Swiss 
climate policy with the EU policy is sensible. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present paper describes and economically assesses the current Swiss energy and climate policy. Its focus is 
on market based instruments since these measures are – at least in theory – efficient and are planned to take an 
ever increasing share in the Swiss policy-mix. It is a typical characteristic of the Swiss policy that different market 
based instruments are applied to various sectors with little or no connection. The CO2 tax which is levied on burning 
fuels aims mainly at the household sector. Large energy-intensive enterprises are exempted from the CO2 tax and 
take part in the Swiss emissions trading scheme. Smaller energy-intensive firms, on the other hand, are also 
exempted from the tax but do not participate in the ETS. They are, however, subject to an individual emission target. 
Finally, in the transport sector a small charge between CHF 0.01 and 0.02 per litre is levied whose proceeds are 
used to finance projects to reduce CO2 emissions domestically. Additionally, for heavy road traffic, a very specific 
performance related fee, the LSVA, serves to internalize local and global external cost. 
While the effectiveness of the policy-mix crucially depends on the stringency of the set targets and the height of the 
tax rates, there are further aspects that need to be considered when assessing the emission reduction potential of 
the instrument-mix in power. First and foremost, there is the additionality problem which requires the quantitative 
determination of a hypothetical situation without policy measures. The problem is well-known and heatedly debated 
with respect to flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and applies in equal measure to national policies in case 
they need to add up to specific emission reduction. In addition, the inter-temporal linkages increase the difficulty for 
Switzerland to achieve its national 2020 target which is according to national legislation, and in contrast to the 
international commitment, to be achieved by domestic measures only. 
With the rather complex scheme of policy measures in Switzerland, special attention needs to be given to the 
danger of double counting. The effectiveness of each measure must not be evaluated stand-alone but within a given 
sequence of all the measures. This paper has described the interaction between the different policies, therefore, a 
quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of the mix would be a task for future research. With respect to 
efficiency, it is little surprising that the Swiss policy-mix with its wide array of independent measures hardly attains 
a cost minimizing reduction of domestic CO2 emissions. Our analysis shows that abatement costs between different 
emissions sources vary from CHF 6 to CHF 186 per ton CO2 with the lowest price incentives to reduce emissions 
for the given fleet of passenger cars. While administrative costs will make it impossible or at least too expensive to 
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perfectly equalise marginal abatement cost across all emitters, the current policy scheme seems to have potential 
for substantial efficiency gains. 
Given the political opposition against a comprehensive CO2 policy across all emitters, a future differentiation should 
not focus on the price but on the endowment of emissions rights or the redistribution of public revenues. This can 
include grandfathering emission rights or, in case of a CO2 tax on motor fuels, the simultaneous reduction of 
automobile taxes that are not performance related. Such amendments allow taking account of political aspects 
without scarifying efficiency. In fact, the Swiss climate policy encompasses – with the notable exception of 
international aviation – almost all emitters. Therefore, a more efficient scheme does not require the inclusion of 
hitherto unregulated groups but rather a more coherent approach to the already regulated sectors. 
The literature review seems to suggest that there are a number of studies published using economic models to 
estimate impacts of different policies ex-ante. However, a gap has been identified for empirical ex-post analysis of 
some policies, namely the CO2 levy, CH ETS, the offset schemes and target agreements. 
Also, a conceptual separation of local and global external cost has not been considered yet. Although the federal 
administration comprehensively assesses external costs, the existing instruments do not tackle local and global 
objectives separately. It is still an open question how a policy-mix that distinguishes local and global objectives and 
at the same time takes domestic and international political restrictions into account could look like.  
Since the new energy and climate policy in Switzerland will not come into power before 2020, there is now potential 
for future research in this area which will be valuable in order to develop the long-term policies and measures under 
the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050. 
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ANNEX 
Table A1: Phase I allocation and banking. 
Usually refers to CHUs 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Phase I 2013 
Total free Allocation 3'259'764 3'309'016 3'337'581 3'162'554 3'454'474 16'523'389 5'356'061
Total Auctioning 0 0 0 0 0 0 281'643
Total Obligation 2'783'715 2'571'092 2'844'033 2'671'779 2'592'567 13'463'186 5'429'951
Overallocation 476'049 737'924 493'548 490'775 861'907 3'060'203 202'913
% Total Allocation 15% 22% 15% 16% 25% 19% 4% 
Total Surrendered CHU1 2'787'942 2'572'990 2'833'520 2'701'072 2'126'128 13'021'652 28'636 
Total Surrendered CHU2       4'175'922
Total Surrendered CERs 1'292 2'850 2'682 19'809 459'140 485'773 1'219'781
Total Surrendered ERUs 0 0 0 0 69'679 69'679 0 
Total Overallocation 477'341 740'774 496'230 510'584 1'321'047 3'615'655 1'422'694
% of Total Allocation 15% 22% 15% 16% 38% 22% 25% 
Total Overallocation by Phase II companies 181'875 305'919 182'594 186'680 538'133 1'361'124  
Total Use CERs & ERUs 0 0 0 7'600 253'706 261'306  
Total potential banking by Phase II companies 147'798 192'628 85'121 16'183 463'205 904’935  
Note: No banking for Cimex the cement association is assumed which took part for example for Holcim. 
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